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Abstract  
Cloud computing has emerged as a popular paradigm and an attractive 
model for providing a reliable distributed computing model.it is increasing 
attracting huge attention both in academic research and industrial initiatives. 
Cloud deployments are paramount for institution and organizations of all scales. 
The availability of a flexible, free open source cloud platform designed with no 
propriety software and the ability of its integration with legacy systems and third-
party applications is fundamental. Open stack is a free and opensource software 
released under the terms of Apache license with a fragmented and distributed 
architecture making it highly flexible. This project was initiated and aimed at 
designing a secured cloud infrastructure called BradStack, which is built on 
OpenStack in the computing Laboratory at the University of Bradford. In this 
report, we present and discuss the steps required in deploying a secured 
BradStack Multi-node cloud infrastructure and conducting Penetration testing on 
OpenStack Services to validate the effectiveness of the security controls on the 
BradStack platform. This report serves as a practical guideline, focusing on 
security and practical infrastructure related issues. It also serves as a reference 
for institutions looking at the possibilities of implementing a secured cloud 
solution. 
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1			Introduction		
 
Cloud Computing represents a major shift in the Information Technology (IT) 
services landscape. Cloud has simplified the availability of enterprise-grade 
computing power to the organisation, without the need to invest in hardware or staff 
and associated costs for procurement activities. According to Mell and Grance [1], 
Cloud refers to the use of computing resources in which hardware and/or software 
resides on a remote machine often based on virtualization, computing technologies 
distributed and delivering to the end users as a service over a network. The most 
popular delivery network is being the internet, for example, when using online 
services to edit documents, listen to music, send emails and store files (e.g. 
Dropbox). Cloud architectures are highly abstract resources, scalable, flexible, near 
instantaneous provision, shared resources on demand, usually with a ‘pay as you 
go’ billing system, which turns computing into a utility.   
The adoption of cloud computing by organisations has become prevalent in this 
21st century. A recent survey conducted by North Bridge shows that 50% of the 
companies had implemented cloud about 90% of which, their operations in one 
way or another is compared to only 60% in 2014 [2].Furthermore, Gartner[3] 
projected that cloud market will reach $246.8 billion in 2017 alone, and also 
forecasted it to grow by more than 34.7% to reach $332.7 billion in 2019, where 
55.3% expected to reach $383.3 billion by 2020 respectively [3]. Cloud computing 
provides numerous advantages to companies; amongst them are low cost, 
flexibility, faster market time, and faster deployment. However, security of data is 
often cited as one of the major concerns for those considering a move towards 
cloud-based services [4].  
Failure to provide an appropriate security control or mechanism on one’s 
infrastructure could lead to data breaches, which could result in financial losses, 
loss of reputation and reduced customer confidence. Thus, cloud security is one of 
the main problems in cloud computing [5]. As the above projection shown by 
Garter[3], more organizations will be using cloud computing, which emphasizes the 
need for more cloud security research to be conducted to find innovative ways to 
secure cloud infrastructure.  
The purpose of this project is to re-deploy and secure the BradStack environment 
whilst addressing the known vulnerabilities from previous architectural design 
including the network infrastructure to ensure that the setup is secure. BradStack is 
a customized implementation of OpenStack open source Cloud Computing 
Platform (CCP) that focuses on the deployment of main services such as 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a 
Service (SaaS). Cloud Modelling and Simulation research group (CMSRG) at 
University of Bradford developed BradStack Cloud Computing Platform (CCP) 
project. The project mentioned above aimed at providing cloud resources mainly 
used for research as well as other services needed by the University community 
and beyond.   
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1.0 The	Concept	of	Cloud	and	it’s	Deployment	Models		
	
Cloud computing can be referred to as a model for enabling appropriate, 
ubiquitous, on-demand network access to a public pool of configurable computing 
assets (e.g., networks, storage, servers, services and applications). These assets 
can be quickly provisioned and released with negligible management effort or 
service provider communication [1]. Cloud computing can be categorized into three 
distinct elements.  Each element has a purpose which performs specific tasks as 
follows; data centers, distributed servers, and clients[6].The four main cloud 
deployment models are public, private, community and hybrid.  
• Public clouds are provided to the public or a large industry group. This is 
managed by a third party selling cloud services. As cloud technology 
develops, public cloud services are becoming more attractive to Business 
companies as well. Many actors such as critical infrastructure providers, 
including financial institutions has shown special interest in cloud[7].  
•  Private cloud is owned and managed by a single organization that 
concentrates on controlling the mechanism of visualizing resources and 
automating services that are used and customized by various lines of 
business and constituent groups. A private cloud provides services to an 
organization through an intranet. Private clouds can be linked to each other 
to form a partner cloud. Private clouds are operated solely for an 
organization[5].  
• Community cloud it is dedicated or allows services to be available to a 
professional community or group of organization that comprises of 
Subcontractors, Branches, allies and so forth to operate collaboratively on a 
project. It may also be a government cloud dedicated to state 
establishments [8]. 
• Hybrid cloud model is a mixture or combination of private and public cloud 
infrastructures working together. As a result, hybrid cloud inherits the 
properties of both private cloud and public cloud. It  allows organizations  to 
manage their critical data and applications in private while outsourcing other 
non-critical activities to the public cloud[9][10]. 
1.1	Cloud	Service	Models	
There are three levels of essential services offered by cloud computing: 
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) and software as a 
service (SaaS). 
• Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), is the most basic and important cloud 
service model under which virtual machines, load balancers, fault tolerance, 
firewalls and networking services are provided[11]. The client or cloud user, 
is provided with capability to provision processing, storage, networks and 
other fundamental computing resources, to deploy and run arbitrary 
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software such as operating system and applications. Common examples of 
these services include Rackspace, GoGrid, EC2, Google Apps, Concur, 
Cisco Webex, Citrix GoTo Meetings, Adobe Marketing Cloud, Facebook, 
Flickr) and Amazon cloud[12] [13] . 
• Under the PaaS model, a computing platform including APIs, operating 
system and development environments are provided as well as 
programming language execution environment and web servers. The client 
maintains the applications, while the cloud provider maintains the service 
run times, databases, server software, integrated server oriented 
architectures and storage networks. Various types of PaaS vendors 
offerings can include complete application hosting, development, testing 
and extensive integrated services that include scalability and 
maintenance[14]. Some key players include Microsoft Windows Azure and 
Google Apps engine GoDaddy, Windows Azure, Apprenda, Google App 
Engine, Amazon Web Services, and WordPress. The main benefit of these 
services include focus on high value software rather than infrastructure, 
leverage economies of scale and provide scalable go-to-market capability 
[15]. 
• SaaS provides clients the capability to use provider application executing on 
a cloud infrastructure. An entire application is available remotely and 
accessible from multiple client devices through thin client interfaces such as 
web browsers. Cloud user do not manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure [2] but providers install and operate the application software. 
Example providers for this service include Salesforce, Facebook and 
Google Apps, Amazon EC2, Rackspace, Microsoft Azure, Google Compute 
Engine and Amazon Web Services [15]–[17].  
 
	
Figure 1.0 Cloud Architecture[45] 
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2			OpenStack	Cloud	Platform	Overview	
 
 
OpenStack, an open source cloud operating system is a cloud operating system 
that controls large pools of compute, storage and networking resources throughout 
a datacenter. The resources are managed through a dashboard giving 
administrators control while empowering its users to provision resources through 
web interfaces [18], [19].It is designed to provide flexibility to design private cloud, 
with no proprietary hardware or software requirements and the ability to integrate 
with legacy systems and third-party technologies. It is designed to manage and 
automate pools of compute resources to work with virtualization technologies and 
high-performance computing configurations. Administrators deploy OpenStack 
compute using one of the multiple supported hypervisors in a virtualized 
environment. KVM and XenServer are popular choices for hypervisor technology 
and recommended for most use cases. Linux container technology such as LXC is 
also supported for scenarios where users wish to minimize virtualization overhead 
to achieve greater efficiency and performance. In addition to different hypervisors, 
OpenStack supports ARM based processors and alternative hardware architectures 
[18]–[20]. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 OpenStack overview[21] 
The OpenStack software consists of the Compute, Network and Storage services 
which collectively provide the OpenStack cloud management capabilities as shown 
in Figure 2.1. These pools of resources can be managed or consumed from a 
single place using the OpenStack dashboard. Both the users and the administrators 
can utilize the dashboard to perform their tasks in a simple easy manner[22]. 
OpenStack cloud operating system controls the layer that sits above all the 
virtualized layers and provides a simple and consistent way to access services 
regardless of the technology used on the hypervisor. OpenStack Hypervisor 
technology list (KVM, Hyper V, VMware, Xen, etc.) 
7	
	
 
Figure 2.2 OpenStack Architecture[22] 
Figure 2.2 presents the OpenStack conceptual architecture while Table 1 describes 
the OpenStack services that make up the OpenStack architecture: OpenStack 
consists of 6 main components, which apply to infrastructure as a service(IaaS), 
these are OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone), OpenStack Compute (Nova), 
OpenStack Networking service (neutron), OpenStack Image Service (Glance), 
OpenStack Block Storage service (cinder) and OpenStack Dashboard (Horizon), 
[22]. This work only focuses on Keystone, Nova, Neutron, Glance, Cinder and 
Horizon, due to the time and document constants.  
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Table 1  OpenStack Services. 
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3			Open	Source	Cloud	Platform	Comparison	
	
This section presents a critical analysis of open source toolkits and their suitability 
as well as the findings obtained from the comparative studies. The methodology 
and approach based on the concept of cloud computing is presented and the 
experimental results for the benefit of migrating to cloud using OpenStack. 
	3.1	Findings	obtained	from	the	Comparative	Technical	Studies	
	
Table 2 presents a comparative technical analysis between various open source 
IaaS cloud computing solutions such as Eucalyptus, CloudStack, OpenStack, 
OpenNebula, Nimbus, Xen Cloud Platform (XCP), OpenIoT and AbiCloud. Each 
open source software provides the IaaS to deliver a standard virtualization 
environment, using the following classification criteria: Origin and Community 
support, architecture, relation with Amazon, cloud implementation, programming 
and scripting language, Hypervisor supported, Operating system support, 
databases, Image management, VM migration support, Fault tolerance and load 
balancing. The findings obtained from the comparative technical studies carried out 
between the eight OpenSource Cloud solutions are as follows: 
• OpenNebula is ideal for users who wants to setup a cloud environment 
using a couple of machines because of its architecture as a classical 
cluster, which is an architecture with a front-end and a set of cluster nodes 
to run the VMs. This implies that at least one physical network is required to 
connect all cluster nodes with the front-end. It is compatible with Xen, KVM 
and VMware hypervisors and works with various operating systems such as 
CentOS, Debian, fedora, RHEL and Ubuntu. It supports Fault tolerance and 
Load balancing. 
• Eucalyptus is tailored towards institutions or organizations that want to build 
their own private cloud but does not support virtual machine migration. It is 
compatible with AWS application programming interface. 
• Nimbus mainly targets features of the scientific community such as support 
for proxy credentials, batch schedulers, and best-effort allocations. It is also 
compatible with AWS application programming interface and most Linux 
distributions. However, it does not support virtual machine migration, 
making it more suitable for users interested in internal techniques of the 
system. 
• XCP is an open source enterprise server virtualization and cloud-computing 
platform. It concentrates more on the provision of tools to manage a 
collection of virtualized host. Even though it was developed under Public 
License and supports Fedora, Red Hat and CentOS, its greatest limitation is 
that, it does not offer a user interface to manage the cloud user access 
using only command line input. 
• CloudStack supports key features such as Hypervisor agnostic, built high 
availability for host, VMs, snapshot management, Virtual machine migration, 
load balancing and fault tolerance. It is compatible with AWS’s application 
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programming interface and its programming framework in Java and Python. 
The biggest drawback is that CloudStack architecture is to have a reduced 
installation flexibility and lack of support for shared access. 
• AbiCloud is an open source platform used to develop, manage and integrate 
private and public cloud in a homogenous environment. However, it does 
not support VM migration, fault tolerance and is not compatible with AWS’s 
application programming interface even though its programming framework 
is Java and Python and works with Xen, KVM, VMware and VirtualBox. 
• OpenStack is free and open source software released under the terms of 
the Apache license with a fragmented and distributed architecture making it 
highly flexible. It is compatible with hypervisors such as KVM, XEN, QEMU 
and Hyper-V and is written in Python and UNIX shell. It has AWS EC2 
compatibility, supports AWS S3 API and is an open source platform for 
building private and public cloud. It has a broad range of support from major 
tech key industry players like Dell, IBM, NASA, Rackspace, Cisco, HP etc. 
OpenStack supports image management, VM migration, load balancing and 
fault tolerance as well as a web interface for user’s access. 
• OpenIoT is completely free open source blueprint middleware infrastructure 
for developing and integrating non-trivial IoT applications. It supports 
virtually any sensor type available by enabling and facilitating the integration 
and use of virtually any internet-connected physical or virtual sensor to IoT 
applications.  It embraces AWS and it is an open source platform for 
building a sensor-centric private and public cloud. The OpenIoT Cloud 
software is written in Java and built on popular open source packages such 
as Apache Active MQ and JBoss Netty [23]. It is also available under a 
Business-Friendly License, i.e. GPL 3.0 which enables enterprises 
particularly SMEs to use it for solution development and deployment. It uses 
the web as an access interface. 
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Table 2 Comparison of Opensource Cloud implementation tools 
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3.2	Summary	
	
Figure 3.1 presents the Open Source Cloud Tools Analysis Quadrant where it was 
observed that the tools located in third quadrant (OpenStack and OpenNebula) are 
the most flexible in terms of data centre virtualization, infrastructure provision and 
relation with Amazon web services while the least tools located in quadrant one 
(AbiCloud, Nimbus and Xen) and least are not as flexible as the others. Eucalyptus, 
OpenIOT and CloudStack are in the middle of the quadrant because they are not as 
flexible as tools located in the third quadrant but are much better that tools located 
in the first quadrant. 
 
								
	
         Figure 3.1 Open Source Cloud Tools Analysis Quadrant 
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4			Cloud	information	security	vulnerabilities	
	
The security risks and requirements for each cloud model vary depending on 
factors such as architecture, deployment model and the sensitivity of information 
assets. Security concerns from traditional infrastructure still affect the cloud 
infrastructure especially from the perspective of cloud service provider, including 
threats that are associated with cloud computing such as virtual machine escape 
[24].One of the first steps in reducing risk associated with cloud computing is to 
identify cloud security threats. Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has created industry-
wide standards for cloud security. Which provides best practices to secure cloud 
computing, that is addressed within the fourteen domains of CSA Guidance. CSA 
suggest a regular vulnerability scanning, prompt patch management, and can help 
mitigate such threats. While there are numerous security threats in the cloud 
computing related to on-demand, the shared nature of cloud computing. Data 
breaches, insecure API’s and system application vulnerabilities will be explored in 
this research. The Open Web Application Security Project OWASP (2017) and CSA 
generated a list of the most critical security vulnerabilities; which are Buffer 
Overflow, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), Command Injection, SQL Injection, etc. Cloud 
computing heavily relies on the web application to deliver the service to its 
customers, therefore, is important to minimize the potential risk. Thus, this report 
will cover the most critical security flaws highlighted by OWASP and CSA.  
Furthermore, it has been addressed that insecure API in the cloud can affect the 
organization business, loss of customers, financial loss, and loss organization 
reputation [5].In 2016 a breach that exposed insecure API took place at an online 
greeting card vendor Moonping in USA. As a result, numerous customer’s 
information was obtained. Hence, it obvious that APIs security is a serious security 
challenge because it is the public door to the cloud.  
4.1	Overview	of	information	security	
Information systems security refers to any activities designed to protect information 
systems, protect sensitive information or data from unauthorized use, access, 
modification, destruction, disclosure and disruption in order provide to provide 
integrity, confidentiality and availability  
The international standard, ISO/IEC 27002 [25], defines information security as the 
preservation of, confidentiality, integrity and availability.it consists of the processes 
and mechanisms that are deployed to protect information systems from all threats 
whether the external or internal. According to [26], [27]these terminologies are also 
known in information security as the CIA triangle. 
 
4.1.1	Confidentiality	
[28] defines confidentiality as the prevention of sensitive information from reaching 
unauthorized entity. End-users who used the cloud services to store their personal 
data in the provider’s infrastructure, concern about user data confidentiality and 
privacy. Therefore, confidentiality is the most serious concern in cloud especially for 
data storage for instance customer data and credit card information [4], [29].As a 
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result, encryption is the fundamental solution to improve data, communications, 
processes confidentiality [30]. [31]studied the privacy and security issues in the 
cloud computing. However, the discussion of the security challenges was focused on 
confidentiality availability, integrity and accountability but they did not mention the 
limitations that caused the vulnerabilities such infrastructure design. This report aims 
to provide a step-by-step guideline for design and deployment as well as testing of a 
secure OpenStack cloud computing platform. discover and highlight the security 
issues and limitations that lead to security holes and vulnerabilities in cloud 
computing.  
 
4.1.2	Integrity	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												
According to [32] Data integrity is the assurance to eliminate third parties from 
auditing the data. Since the fundamental solution to ensure confidentiality cloud 
computing, hence, data integrity should be checked and maintained constantly to 
guarantee that data are accurate. Cloud providers should ensure that any 
modification to the data is detected. Integrity also covered that computer programs 
execution should be protected from malware, malicious user or insider, which may 
render an incorrect result or change the program execution[33]. Over the years, 
researchers have proposed different data integrity scheme, for instance, ithe authors 
in [34]highlights the importance of data integrity and presented a taxonomy of data 
integrity schemes that could be used in for cloud computing. However, Solutions 
proposed are not suitable for all types of data and environments. 
	
4.1.3	Availability	
Availability remains a challenge in cloud computing since cloud systems 
infrastructure are complex because it provides different services with different 
requirements. According to Khan et al. availability is calculated as the percentage of 
time an application and its services are available, given a specific time interval. Many 
services can be used to improve the availability of a service, such as, load 
balancing, and redundancy [35]  
4.2	Insecure	API	
Service representation in cloud computing is given by client applications, supported 
by application program interface (API)[36] . In practical, API is a middleware that 
uses to integrate between underlying layers where developers use them for the 
application development and high- level applications layer [37]. Many researchers 
studied clouds and API security in particular, [38]summarized that APIs should 
provide flexible security interfaces to limit the existing security holes. One of the 
suggestion is that API should be provided with standards and security controls to 
enhance APIs with authentication and authorization using Open Authorization 
Protocol (OAuth). However, in 2015 Phogat and Sujatha studied OAuth 
authentication protocol mechanism in APIs, they conclude that OAuth security does 
not provides an acceptable security level. On the other hand, [39]highlighted that 
OAuth is an ideal candidate for Software as a Service, nevertheless different 
service provides use different version of OAuth and offer different 
authentication/authorization process which posing interesting challenges at the 
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same time. Therefore, they proposed OAuthHub solution which used as a single 
trusted intermediary to control and manage data is shared and how authentication 
is done. In addition, the proposed solution required to isolate the APIs in the 
memory.  In fact, the cloud applications may have subjected to the same 
vulnerabilities as traditional Web applications. Nevertheless,[34] stated that the 
traditional security solutions are not sufficient for the cloud computing environment. 
This is probably driven from the fact that cloud computing vulnerabilities can lead to 
huge damage and propagate more widely. The distributed location of multiple 
users, resources and data make the cloud computing security a serious issue. 
Therefore, management, use and development of Web applications must consider 
web application vulnerabilities risk to protect the cloud. Insecure API can be 
disturbing for the users and the cloud. The APIs vulnerabilities includes insufficient 
authorization, input-data validation and weak credentials. However, after exhaustive 
research, it was founded that there is a lack of researches that consider API in open 
stack. Thus, this thesis focuses on implementing a penetration testing on API open 
stack core services.  
4.3	Information	security	protection	
Information security protection may be achieved through implementing technical, 
physical, management, and operational measures designed to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. [40]suggest that such control 
to consist of Detective, Preventative, Responsive and countermeasures such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and firewalls. 
Effective information systems controls include multiple layers’ approach, to mitigate 
the threats such an approach is very effective if one control is bypassed the other 
control can detect or prevent threat such as having Network based IDS and Host 
IDS. 
Table 3 Comparison of firewalls advanced features 
FIREWALL CHANGING 
DEFAULT 
POLICY TO 
ACCEPT/REJECT 
(BY ISSUING A 
SINGLE RULE) 
ETHERNE
T MAC 
DESTINA
TION 
ADDRES
S 
ETHERNE
T 
MAC 
SOURCE 
ADDRESS 
INBOUND 
FIREWALL 
(INGRESS) 
CHANGE 
TTL? 
(TRANSPAR
ENT TO 
TRACEROU
TE) 
CONFIGUR
E 
REJECTWIT
H ANSWER 
AV 
(ANTIVIR
US) 
PFSENSE YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
UNTANGL
E YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
VYATTA YES NO YES NO NO NO YES 
IPFIRE YES YES NO YES YES NO YES 
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4.3.1	Firewall	
Firewall as described by [41] is a network security device that monitors incoming and 
outgoing network traffic that can be a software program or a dedicated network 
appliance, which decides whether to allow or block specific traffic based on a defined 
set of security rules Since this project is focused on opens source solution, many 
open source firewalls have been looked at e.g. IPfire, Vyttta, Untangle and Pfsense. 
Based on the comparison of various features such as usability, advanced rule-set, 
rule-set Appliance-UTM filtering, base OS, pfsense is the preferred tool of choice 
because of its versatility. 
Pfsense is an open source network firewall distribution, based on the FreeBSD 
operating system with a custom kernel which including third-party open source 
software packages for additional functionality pfsense.org [42]. Pfsense can 
implement the same performance as commercial firewalls, without any of the 
artificial limitations [42]. 
4.3.2	Intrusion	Detection	
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a network security technology originally for 
detecting vulnerability exploits against a target application or computer. Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) extended IDS solutions by adding the ability to block 
threats in addition to detecting them [40], [43]. 
A vast amount of research has been carried by many researchers comparing the two 
best known open sources IDS/IPS snort and suricate. For instance,[40] looks at 
performance deference’s between two IDS/IPS and suggest that snort is better. In 
addition [43] Compares the fail positives, their result suggests snort is better. For this 
project, snort will be used. 
   
5	Step-by-Step	OpenStack	Deployment		
 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this report is to detail the steps required to perform 
a complete installation of OpenStack on multiple nodes. We split the installation 
process into two parts: 
The first part is Deploying, securing BradStack multi-node OpenStack cloud 
infrastructure and developing OpenStack deployment toolkit.The second part is 
focused on conducting Penetration testing on OpenStack Services to validate the 
effectiveness of the security controls on the BradStack CCP.  
This report describes how the BradStack OpenStack cloud infrastructure was 
designed, built and configured. The chapter also looks at the installation of the 
following security mechanisms; Pfsense firewall, snort (IPS/IDS) and Cisco switch 
hardening that include a step by step guide to using the proposed OpenStack 
installation toolkit.  
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5.1	Hardware	Setup
Table 4 Hardware Setup and Specifications 
Component Quantity Description 
Admin PXE node 1 Dell Optiplex 745 
• CPU: Intel Core 2  6400 @ 2.13GHz X 2 Cores 
• RAM: 2 GB 
• OS: 64 Bit 
• HDD: 160 GB 
• NIC: X 1 
Cloud Controller 
 
1 Dell Precision T5400 
• CPU: Intel Xeon E5405 @ 2.00GHz X 8 Cores 
• RAM: 32 GB 
• OS: 64 Bit 
• HDD: 1TB 
• NIC: X 2 
 
Compute servers 
 
2 Dell Precision T3400 
• CPU: Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600 @ 2.40GHz X 4 
Cores 
• RAM: 4 GB 
• OS: 64 Bit 
• HDD: 500 GB 
• NIC: X 1 
Block Storage 
Server 
1 Dell PowerEdge 1600SC 
• CPU: Intel Xeon @ 2.8GHz X 2 Cores 
• RAM: 4 GB 
• OS: 64 Bit 
HDD: 150 GB 
Network server 1 Dell Precision T3400 
• CPU: Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600 @ 2.40GHz X 4 
Cores 
• RAM: 4 GB 
• OS: 64 Bit 
• HDD: 500 GB 
Data switch 1 HP Procurved Networking 10Gbps 
Private switch 1 ZyXEL Internet Security gateway 
Cables 
 
7 x RJ 45 straight through copper cables 
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5.2	Proposed	BradStack	Architectural	Design		
 
	
										Figure	5.1	Proposed	BradStack	Design	
 
 
Figure 5.1 depicts the proposed infrastructure topology (and architecture) of the 
redesigned, secured and reconfigured BradStack OpenStack CCP. The 
architecture comprises of the additional security layer using the PfSense firewall, 
snort IDS/IPS, tunnelling to segment networks as well as the failover strategy. 
Details of the architecture and how it’s been implemented are provided in the next 
subsections.  
 
5.3	Network	Infrastructure	Implementation	and	Configuration		
The following sections looks at steps taken to install Pfsense, snort and Cisco 
switch hardening including their configurations. 
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5.4	Installing	and	Configuring	Snort		
This section evidences the installation configuration and updating of snort IPD/IDS. 
Snort has been discussed in chapter 2. Snort status can be found Figure 3-2 shows 
the status of the snort installed rules.   
 
	
Figure 5.2 snort update status  
5.5	Configuring	Switch		
This section looks at implementing Cisco’s best practices for device hardening 
which include the following countermeasures; service password-encryption, BPDU 
guard, transport input SSH and switch port-security including mac-address sticky 
have been implemented and tested.  
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5.6			IP	Addressing	Table		
	
Table 5 IP addressing table  
OPENSTACK	
SERVICE	
NAME	
HOSTNAME	 MANAGEMENT	
VLAN	 REPOSITORY	
VLAN	
INTERNET	
VLAN	
NFS	VLAN	 TENNANT	VLAN	
TENNANT	
VLAN	
CONTROLLER 	 Richmond1 	 192.168.1.100 	  	 192.168.20.99 	  	  	  	
 	 Richmond2 	 192.168.1.101 	  	 192.168.20.100 	  	  	  	
NETWORK 	  	 192.168.1.	106 	  	 192.168.20.110 	  	
192.168.3.0/24 	 192.168.4.0/24 	
 	  	 192.168.1.107 	  	 192.168.20.111 	  	  	  	
COMPUTE 	 Horton1 	 192.168.1.110 	 192.168.2.101 	 192.168.20.101 	
192.168.10.101 	
 	  	
 	 Horton2 	 192.168.1.111 	 192.168.2.102 	 192.168.20.102 	
192.168.10.102 	
 	  	
 	 Horton3 	 192.168.1. 112 	 192.168.2.103 	 192.168.20.103 	
192.168.10.103 	
 	  	
 	 Horton4 	 192.168.1. 113 	 192.168.2.104 	 192.168.20.104 	
192.168.10.104 	
 	  	
CINDER 	 Phoenix1 	 192.168.1.120 	  	 192.168.20.120 	  	  	  	
 	 Phoenix2 	 192.168.1.121 	  	 192.168.20.121 	  	  	  	
SWIFT 	 Ashfield1 	 192.168.1.130 	  	 192.168.20.130 	  	  	  	
 	 Ashfield2 	 192.168.1.131 	  	 192.168.20.131 	  	  	  	
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6			BradStack	Implementation	and	Configuration		
	
This section gives a brief overview of OpenStack Alternative installer, OpenStack 
installation toolkit, BradStack OpenStack deployment process, BradStack 
OpenStack Cloud Infrastructure implementation and BradStack CCP cloud testing.  
6.1	OpenStack	Alternative	Installer	Comparison		
PackStack: Packstack is an OpenStack installer that uses Puppet for deploying 
OpenStack services. Puppet modules deploy OpenStack components on multiple 
pre-installed servers over SSH automatically [22]. 
DevStack : DevStack is a sequence of expansible shell scripts used to rapidly 
install OpenStack environment depending on the latest versions of everything from 
git master. It is deployed as a development setting and as the basis for much of the 
OpenStack project's functional testing[22].  
ANVIL : ANVIL is open source python shell scripts and utilities that can be used to 
deploy OpenStack. This tool is mainly for developers [22].  
Table 6 depicts OpenStack alternative installer. It can be observed from the table 
below that DevStack is a developer installer and it's not stable. But ANVIL only 
supports older version of Centos, which is a big limitation and also, it's not stable 
and doesn’t support multiple node installations. PackStack is also a developer 
installer which is not stable as the rest of the developer installers mentioned above. 
Juju and MaaS are commercial installation tools their biggest drawback is the 
difficulty level of the installation and also limits the number of nodes one can deploy 
for free. As stated by [44]This limitation of Juju and MaaS is similar when it comes 
to fuel Mirantis. However, our installer overcome all the limitations associated with 
the installation tools presented above with the additional advantages of 
modularization approaches which is capable of production environment deployment 
and easy to install. 
Table 6 OpenStack Installer Comparison  
 
Features\ 
installer 
 
Devstack 
 
ANVIL 
 
PackStack 
 
Juju and 
MaaS 
 
Mirantis 
fuel 
Proposed 
Installation toolkit 
 
Deployment 
 
Developer 
 
Developer 
 
Developer 
 
Commercial 
 
Commercial 
 
Production 
environment 
 
Supporting 
operating 
System 
 
Ubuntu, 
fedora and 
centos 
RHEL7 
 
RHEL 6.2 
Centos 
Oracle 
enterprise 
 
Ubuntu 
Centos 7 
 
 
Ubuntu 
 
 
Ubuntu 
 
 
Centos 
  Support 
Multinode 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
opensource 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Stability of 
deployment 
Setup 
 
no 
 
no 
 
Stable than 
devstack 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Difficulty 
level   
no  no  normal  High  High  easy  
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6.2	BradStack	OpenStack	Deployment	Process		
This deployment toolkit is based on OpenStack installation tutorials and guides. 
Even with the tutorial provided, installation is not that straightforward due to its 
complexity and the number of steps required to get fully functional Cloud 
infrastructure as discussed in the previous section.  Figure 6.1 below illustrates the 
process for implementing BradStack OpenStack Octaca based on the development 
toolkit.  
 
  
	
Figure 6.1 BradStack OpenStack deployment process  
	 •  Design  
Involves selecting the operating systems, choosing OpenStack service model, 
installing and updating all nodes, configuring network interfaces and name 
resolution and conducting basic connectivity test.  
	
	 •  Install		
At this step, all OpenStack Dependents and requirements are installed after adding 
Centos-Release-OpenStack-Ocata and epel7 repository. Each service has its own 
shell script to install all its requirements.   
	 	•    Database Setup		
This involves installing and creating database for all the selected services during 
the design stage in contrast to OpenStack guide where the database for each 
service is configured as the service is being installed.  
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	 •  Register		
This step involves the creation of domains, projects, users, and roles and all 
services selected during the design phase created including API endpoints. 
OpenStack uses three API endpoint variants for each service: admin, internal, and 
public endpoint. The admin API endpoint allows modifying users and tenants. More 
details on OpenStack API endpoints can be found in the next section.  
 •  Start  
This step involves installing and configuring service before starting them for 
instance Glance, Nova, Neutron and Cinder. This includes controller node and 
services in their relevant node such as Nova in compute node. This is dependent 
on the design stage what OpenStack Services are required and some core service 
that is required in any design.   
	 •  Test		
At this step, all installed OpenStack services will be verified, followed by 
functionality testing which involves creating network and starting virtual machines.  
  
6.3	BradStack	OpenStack	Implementation	Process	
	
In this section, we will cover the procedures to install OpenStack using the 
suggested toolkit and the process mentioned above. Each service has its own shell 
script in line with the installation process steps. Below is the flow and layout of the 
OpenStack installation toolkit.  
		
	
		
Figure 6.2 BradStack Installation toolkit layout  
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6.3.1	Step	1:		Design	(BradStack	design)		
The BradStack infrastructure Design is based on the BradStack requirement in 
terms of what services for example storage as a service detects the installing of 
swift. This service and their variations have been discussed in the previous chapter. 
Figure 6.3 below is the service design for BradStack. The controller box shows all 
the services installed on the controller node, Compute box show the services 
installed on the compute node, storage shows the services installed in the storage 
nodes and the block storage box shows all the service installed block storage 
nodes. Centos 7.3 has been chosen over Ubuntu as the base systems because 
Ubuntu tends to be less conservative than CentOS, which means that its 
repositories contain fresher packages, whereas CentOS packages tend to focus on 
security patches, stability and consistency.  
 
 
	
Figure 6.3 BradStack Service Design  
6.3.2	Step	2:	Install	(installation	requirements)		
Adding centos-release-OpenStack, EPEL repository and install dependents on all 
nodes. All this done by a shell script, which is named requirements.sh. Each service 
has different requirements so thus, each module has one below are the three 
module and their requirement shell scripts. 
	
Controller-node:		
#the	following	must	be	run	as	
root	cd 
/Desktop/deployment-
kit/controller-node 	
./chmodcontroller +x 
*.sh- requirements.sh  
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Compute-node		
#the	following	must	be	run	
as	root	cd 
/Desktop/deploymen
t-kit/compute-node 
chmod +x *.sh 	
./compute-
requirements.sh 	
			
Storage-node:		
#the	following	must	be	run	as	root		
cd 
/Desktop/deployment-
kit/storage-node	
chmod +x *.sh	
./storage-node-
requirements.sh	
		
6.3.3	Step	3:	Setup	database	(services	database	creation)		
This step only applies the controller nodes (Richmond). MariaDB-server-10.0, 
MariaDB-client was installed using the shell script named database.sh. This script 
creates all database for the services that have been selected at the design stage of 
BradStack. Below is the command in the database install scripts. 
 
Install Database  
 
yum -y erase mysql 
yum -y install mariadb-galera-server mariadb-galera-
common mariadb-galera	
galera	
yum -y install OpenStack-utils	
crudini --set /etc/my.cnf.d/server.cnf mysqld 
max_allowed_packet 256M         sed -i -r "s/^bind-
address.*=.*0.0.0.0/bind-	
address=0.0.0.0\nmax_connections=$dbmaxcon
s/" /etc/my.cnf.d/galera.cnf         
systemctl enable mariadb.service         
systemctl start mariadb.service	
/usr/bin/mysqladmin -u $mysqldbadm password 
$mysqldbpassword > /dev/null 2>&1	
/usr/bin/mysqladmin -u $mysqldbadm -h $dbbackendhost 
password $mysqldbpassword > /dev/null 2>&1	
	
After installing the database software then followed by services databases are 
installed starting with Keystone, Nova, Glance, Neutron and cinder. Only keystone 
script snippet will be shown below due to document constants. The full script will be 
available made available online for reference. 
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echo "CREATE DATABASE $keystonedbname default character 
set utf8;"|$mysqlcommand         echo "GRANT ALL ON 
$keystonedbname.* TO '$keystonedbuser'@'%' 
IDENTIFIED BY 	
'$keystonedbpass';"|$mysqlcommand   
 echo "GRANT ALL ON $keystonedbname.* TO 
'$keystonedbuser'@'localhost' 	
IDENTIFIED BY '$keystonedbpass';"|$mysqlcommand         
echo "GRANT ALL ON $keystonedbname.* TO 
'$keystonedbuser'@'$keystonehost' 	
IDENTIFIED BY 
'$keystonedbpass';"|$mysq
lcommand         for 
extrahost in 
$extrakeystonehosts 	
        do 	
            echo "GRANT ALL ON $keystonedbname.* TO 
'$keystonedbuser'@'$extrahost' 	
IDENTIFIED BY '$keystonedbpass';"|$mysqlcommand 	
        done  
        echo "FLUSH PRIVILEGES;"|$mysqlcommand 
  
6.3.4	Step:4	Register	(service	registration	and	identities)		
	
This step will install keystone, bootstrap keystone, create services, add a member 
and all the service from design step will have a service created and endpoint. Using 
script keystone.sh. This toolkit has been designed in a modular approach, which 
means for each service has its own keystone install script, for instance, keystone-
glance, which would create glance service and the API endpoints.  
	
Installing keystone  
cd 
/Desktop/deployment-
kit/controller-node 
chmod./core +-
xservices *.sh 
/install-keystone.sh 	
	
yum -y install OpenStack-keystone OpenStack-utils 
OpenStack-selinux python-psycopg2 	
yum -y install mod_wsgi memcached 
python-memcached httpd yum -y 
install python-OpenStackclient 	
# We also start/enable memcached service 	
cat ./libs/memcached/memcached 
> /etc/sysconfig/memcached 
systemctl enable memcached 
systemctl stop memcached 
systemctl start memcached 	
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# Using pyhton based "ini" configuration tools, we 
begin Keystone configuration crudini --set 
/etc/keystone/keystone.conf DEFAULT compute_port 
8774 crudini --set /etc/keystone/keystone.conf 
DEFAULT debug False crudini --set 
/etc/keystone/keystone.conf DEFAULT log_file 	
/var/log/keystone/keystone.log 	
crudini --set /etc/keystone/keystone.conf DEFAULT 
use_syslog False crudini --set 
/etc/keystone/keystone.conf memcache servers 
$keystonehost:11211 
 	
After installing keystone service users are created, roles and endpoints for Nova, 
Glance, Neutron and cinder on snippet for neutron will be shown below 
.	source $keystone_admin_rc_file echo "" 	
echo "Creating 
NEUTRON 
Identities" 
echo "" 	
#"Neutron User:" 	
OpenStack user create --domain $keystonedomain --password  
$neutronpass --email 	
$neutronemail $neutronuser 	
#"Neutron Role:" 	
OpenStack role add --project $keystoneservicestenant --user 
$neutronuser 	
$keystoneadminuser 	
#" 
Neutron Service:" OpenStack service create \ 	
        --name $neutronsvce \ 	
        --description "OpenStack Networking" \ 	
        network 	
#"Neutron Endpoints:" 	
OpenStack endpoint create -
-region $endpointsregion \     
network public 
http://$neutronhost:9696 
OpenStack endpoint create -
-region $endpointsregion \     
network internal 
http://$neutronhost:9696 
OpenStack endpoint create -
-region $endpointsregion \     
network admin 
http://$neutronhost:9696 	
			
6.3.5	Step:	5	Start	(starting	the	OpenStack	services)		
In this step, all services will be started then in the next step verified in the next step.		
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cd /Desktop/deployment-kit/ ./OpenStack-
services-restart.sh		
	
6.3.6	Step:	6	Test	(service	verification)		
This section will involve verifying that all services are running, creating a network, 
flavors, uploading an image to glance and finally launching the virtual machine. 
Only Nova and cinder service will be displayed due to document constraints. The 
following will involve querying service to view their status. Figure 6.4 below shows 
the status of services.  
 
Nova		
		
Figure 6.4 Nova service list  
Cinder  
Figure 3-6 below show the status of cinder services.  
		
Figure 6.5 Cinder Service List  
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7			BradStack	Cloud	Testing			
In this section, the deployed BradStack cloud infrastructure will be extensively 
tested. First, a private network is created, upload image then launching an instance. 
The image below shows the network topology from BradStack functionality test  
 
	
Figure 7.0 Network Topology with running instances 
		
Figure 7.1 Network Topology with webserver and pentest running instance 
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Figure 7.2 Network Topology with windows Server running instance 
7.1		BradStack	OpenStack	Installer		
 
The following is the database-install script  
Database-install.sh		
#!/bin/bash	
#	
	
PATH=	$PATH	:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin	
	
#	
# First, we source our config file.	
#	
if[-f 
./conf/controller
-config.rc ] then 
source 
./conf/controller
-config.rc	 
else	
echo "Can't access controller-config.rc configuration 
file. Aborting !"     echo ""     exit 0 fi	
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echo "Installing Local 
MariaDB  
Software"          
rm /root/.my.cnf     
     yum -y erase mysql	
yum -y install mariadb-galera-server mariadb-galera-
common mariadbgalera galera	
yum -y install OpenStack-utils	
crudini --set /etc/my.cnf.d/server.cnf mysqld 
max_allowed_packet	
256M	
sed -i -r "s/^bind-address.*=.*0.0.0.0/bind-	
address=0.0.0.0\nmax_connections=$dbmaxcons/" 
/etc/my.cnf.d/galera.cnf         systemctl enable 
mariadb.service         systemctl start 
mariadb.service	
/usr/bin/mysqladmin -u $mysqldbadm password $mysqldbpassword 
>	
/dev/null 2>&1	
/usr/bin/mysqladmin -u $mysqldbadm -h $dbbackendhost 
password	
$mysqldbpassword > 
/dev/null 2>&1         
sleep 5	
echo "[client]" > /root/.my.cnf         
echo "user=$mysqldbadm" >> 
/root/.my.cnf         echo 
"password=$mysqldbpassword" >> 
/root/.my.cnf	
echo "GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON *.* TO '$mysqldbadm'@'%' 
IDENTIFIED	
BY '$mysqldbpassword' WITH 
GRANT OPTION;"|mysql         
echo "FLUSH PRIVILEGES;"|mysql	
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m multiport --dports 
$mysqldbport -j ACCEPT	
service 
iptables save         
echo "MariaDB 
Installed"	
# The following two variables are used later in the 
database creation section	
#	
mysqlcommand="mysql --port=$mysqldbport --
password=$mysqldbpassword --	
user=$mysqldbadm --host=$dbbackendhost"	
echo "[client]" > /root/.my.cnf         
echo "user=$mysqldbadm" >> 
/root/.my.cnf  
echo "password=$mysqldbpassword" >> 
/root/.my.cnf  
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echo "Keystone"	
echo "CREATE DATABASE $keystonedbname default 
character set utf8;"|$mysqlcommand         echo 
"GRANT ALL ON $keystonedbname.* TO 
'$keystonedbuser'@'%'	
7.2	Creating	private	network		
Figure 7.3 below shows the creation of private software-defined network (SDN).  
 	
 
Figure 7.3 Private Network Creation   
 
		
Figure 7.4 Moyo Network Overview  
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Figure 7.4 below shows an overview of the entire network with Moyo account which 
includes the public networks that are used for floating allocation 
7.3	Building	an	instance		
The following section demonstrates the brief steps to launching of an instance from 
web application Horizon. The following information is required; image, flavour which 
specifies the how resources the instance needs, for example, random access 
memory (RAM), virtual processing unit (VPU), Operating System image and a 
network.  
		
Figure 7.5 selecting Kali Linux image as the boot source  
Figure 7.5 shows the selection of the image to be booted and figure 7.6 shows the 
status of the launched instance.  
						
							Figure 7.6 Status of Kali instance	
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Figure 7.7 below shows the Kali Linux instance full desktop experience of the test 
instance kali. The building and deploying of the instance took a few minutes which 
shows how fast the infrastructure is in terms of performance. 
 
		
Figure 7.7 Kali Linux full desktop  
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6		Conclusions		
	
Cloud computing’s growing popularity especially using infrastructure as a service 
has inspired many academic institutions to transform their current  infrastructure 
into a private or hybrid cloud. However, even though openstack was not the first to 
propose open source cloud computing frameworks, but it works with popular 
enterprise and open source technologies making it ideal for heterogeneous 
infrastructure. In this report, three issues have been successfully addressed which 
include: securing BradStack’s network infrastructure, configuring and deploying 
BradStack using a developed toolkit as well as testing the entire cloud key 
functionalities. We divided our proposed strategy into two parts: The first part 
involves redesign, redeploying of BradStack CCP using the developed OpenStack 
installation toolkit, and the second part looks at testing all the cintslled cloud 
services.This report serves as a practical guideline to academic instituons intending 
to build a private cloud and focusing on security and practical infrastructure related 
issues. It also serves as a reference for institutions looking at the possibilities of 
implementing a secured cloud solution. 
In the future we will focus on securing BradStack multi-node OpenStack cloud 
infrastructure by incorporating network firewalls, intrution detection and prevention 
sytems, web application firewall, network segregation through the use of virtual 
LANs and implementing Cisco’s best practise on switch hardening 
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